ABNA24 - An academic conference titled "The Role of Martyr Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah in Elucidating and Introducing the Model of Velayi Governance"—part of the scholarly sessions of the Umana al-Rosol Congress—was held in the holy city of Qom, in cooperation with the representative office of the Astan Quds Razavi Organization and the Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the participation of Mojtaba Amani, former Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Lebanon.The meeting, dedicated to examining the character and leadership dimensions of the martyred Secretary-General of Hezbollah, analyzed his doctrinal and political foundations within the framework of the theory of Velayat-e Faqih. Below is the detailed account of Dr. Mojtaba Amani's address at the gathering.
During the session, Dr. Mojtaba Amani elaborated on the position of Velayat-e Faqih, "Governance based on the Guardianship of the Jurist", in the ideology of the Resistance. He stated that Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah's doctrinal foundations concerning Velayi governance and his complete adherence to the principle of Velayat-e Faqih are rooted in his profound understanding of the civilizational and political needs of the Islamic world. To grasp this position, one must first properly understand the characteristics and features of the society in which he operated.
According to Dr. Amani, the structure of Lebanese society is built upon two main elements—Islamic and Christian—with the followers of these two great religions further divided into numerous sects and orientations. In Lebanon, eighteen official sects are recognized, including Shia, Sunni, Druze, and various branches of Christianity such as Catholic, Maronite, and Armenian. Based on the country's history and in order to prevent the outbreak of civil wars, protocols have been established that grant equal rights to all these eighteen sects.
Pointing to the Taif Agreement, he noted that this accord, formed in Saudi Arabia following a prolonged period of civil war, further formalized Lebanon's sectarian structure. One of Lebanon's defining characteristics is that each sect has an extension beyond the country's borders. For this reason, concepts such as "nationality" and "nation" face a serious challenge in Lebanon. Despite propaganda efforts promoting slogans like "Lebanon First" or "Lebanon Above All," in practice, viewing Lebanon as a single unified nation—as seen in Iran, Syria, or Saudi Arabia—is hardly tangible. According to a common belief among experts, a "nation" in its cohesive sense does not exist in Lebanon.
Dr. Amani went on to say that the absence of a unified national identity has led to the reality that seeking support from abroad, or even allegiance to foreign powers, is not considered objectionable by some Lebanese leaders and segments of the population. For instance, in the process of electing the president, we witness the official presence of a group comprising five countries—the United States, France, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar—whose ambassadors officially meet with officials and play a role in selecting the country's highest executive authority.
He added that while in any country with a cohesive national identity, such behavior could be deemed a grave act of treason and even lead to prosecution, in Lebanon this has become an accepted practice, as the roots and ties of many of these sects extend beyond national borders. It should be noted that the head of a sect differs from the head of a political party. Currently, Sheikh Ali Khatib presides over the Shia sect, Patriarch Bechara Rai is the head of the Maronite sect, and the Mufti of Lebanon is recognized as the leader of the Sunni sect. Likewise, Walid Jumblatt and the Sheikh al-Aql lead the Druze, and Sheikh Ali Kaddour is considered the head of the Alawite sect. As for the Armenians, the Catholicos is not only the head of Lebanon's Armenians but the worldwide head of the Armenian Church, with his headquarters located in Lebanon. This sectarian multiplicity has paved the way for the extensive presence and influence of foreign actors in Lebanon's internal affairs.
The former Iranian ambassador to Lebanon emphasized that in past decades, Syria—and figures such as Hafez al-Assad and later Bashar al-Assad—played a decisive role in the election of Lebanon's president. With the weakening of Syria's role, powers such as the United States and France—which consider themselves protectors of Christians—and Saudi Arabia—which serves as the champion of Sunnis—have stepped in. Today, the majority of Sunni representatives, accompanied by the Mufti, visit the Saudi ambassador to carry out necessary coordination. These factors have prevented the formation of a unified nation. On the other hand, the Zionist regime has always regarded Lebanon as an annex to itself, believing it could occupy it whenever it wished, and sought to settle expelled Palestinians on Lebanese soil as a stage in its future expansionist schemes.
Referring to the history of the Shia presence, Amani stated that the condition of Lebanese Shia prior to the activism of Imam Musa al-Sadr and the victory of Iran's Islamic Revolution was extremely difficult. In terms of population, the Shia were a minority compared to Sunnis and Christians and occupied the lower strata of society both socially and economically. At that time, Shia identity was commonly associated with difficult, low-income labor, and this group lacked proportionate political and social influence and standing. Understanding these conditions, Imam Musa al-Sadr launched a purposeful movement to change this situation.
He elaborated: "Based on meetings and conversations I had with Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah—often in the company of figures such as Martyr Amir-Abdollahian—I convey my understanding of these developments. One day I asked him why Imam Musa al-Sadr met such a fate, and why Muammar Gaddafi, in collusion with others, undertook to remove him from the Lebanese scene. He replied that Imam al-Sadr's activism, even before the victory of Iran's Islamic Revolution, posed a serious threat to Israel and the secular militant groups."
The former Iranian diplomat noted that at that time, most anti-Israeli militant groups held secular, nationalist, or communist ideologies and lacked a faith-based, religious outlook. The Zionist regime had invested in ensuring that the Shia in southern Lebanon would be embroiled in war with expelled Palestinians, so that the cost of the conflicts would fall on the Shia, allowing Christians in the north to live peacefully under French protection. Israel's design was for Shia and Palestinians to fight and weaken each other in the south. Even the support provided by the Pahlavi regime in Iran to the Shia of Lebanon was based on this same logic; the Shah wanted to use the Shia as a tool against Sunnis and Palestinian refugees. But Imam Musa al-Sadr, with his acumen, fused "Shia" with "Resistance." This action both disrupted Israel's project and alarmed pro-Palestinian groups that held nationalist or communist foundations. In effect, Imam Musa al-Sadr found himself caught between two blades of a scissor and was eliminated.
Dr. Amani stated that following the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, this path continued with even greater vigor. Although the Amal movement had a history of clashes with Palestinians, approaches shifted with the emergence of Hezbollah. Imam Khomeini (RA), prior to the Revolution, had issued a religious edict forbidding war between Shia and Palestinians and dispatched clerics from Iran to prevent such conflicts. It is interesting to note that the plot to eliminate Imam Musa al-Sadr coincided with similar schemes inside Iran aimed at countering Imam Khomeini's movement—plans that, due to the Shah's fear of Saddam and its repercussions, were partly thwarted. They simultaneously sought to eliminate Imam Khomeini (RA) as well, but the Shah, fearing the consequences, did not agree to Saddam's proposal for such an action in mid-1977. These developments allowed the ideology of Velayat to penetrate deep into Lebanese society.
He added that Hezbollah, much like the Islamic Coalition Party, was formed by the direct order of Imam Khomeini. Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah recounted that in a meeting in Tehran with members of the Islamic Coalition Party, Imam Khomeini (RA) commanded the initial core of Hezbollah—including Martyr Seyyed Abbas Mousavi and others—to establish an independent organization and not to admit those who did not adhere to Velayi thinking. This thinking, founded upon Velayat-e Faqih, developed a civilizational foundation. Every civilization requires three elements for its survival: "economy," "weapon," and "ideology." Hezbollah derived its ideology from Velayat-e Faqih, employed weapons to confront the occupier, and worked to strengthen its economic base. While adhering to Islam and Shia Islam, Hezbollah sought the unity of Lebanese society—Muslims and Christians alike—centered on Resistance against the Zionist enemy as that which would forge the Lebanese nation.
Pointing to Martyr Nasrallah's outspokenness, he noted: "Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah was extremely forthright in expressing his loyalty to Velayat and never practiced dissimulation. In response to those who claimed Iran supplied you with weapons, he would say, with that distinct, powerful tone: 'Our clothes, our food, our bread, our water, and our weapons—all are provided by Iran. Now, what conclusion do you wish to draw from this statement?'"
The former Iranian diplomat recalled that at the Palestine Conference in Tehran, held approximately two decades ago, Martyr Nasrallah—before hundreds of foreign guests—through his humble conduct toward the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, sought to plainly demonstrate who his source of leadership and authority was. According to Amani, Martyr Nasrallah emphasized: "Even if I understand the intention of the Vali-e Faqih, I consider myself bound to obey it."
The former Iranian ambassador to Beirut, explaining the relationship between loyalty to Velayat and Lebanese national sovereignty, asserted that this absolute obedience does not mean disregarding Lebanon's interests. Since the objective of the Islamic Republic is the independence and elevation of Lebanon, these two paths are aligned. In present-day Lebanon, the population is roughly divided among Christians, Sunnis, and Shia—each roughly one-third. However, in accordance with the Taif Accord, the composition of the 128-seat parliament remains based on 50 percent Christian representation (64 seats) and 50 percent Muslim. Of the 64 Muslim seats, 27 are allocated to Shia, 27 to Sunnis, and the remainder to Druze and Alawites.
Concluding his remarks and underscoring the national role of the Resistance, Professor Amani stated that although Lebanon's demographic composition today differs from past legal frameworks, Hezbollah—relying on Velayi thought—has managed to operate beyond the confines of sectarianism and become an effective force for good and stability across all of Lebanon. This thinking, founded by Martyr Seyyed Abbas Mousavi and brought to its zenith during the era of Martyr Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah, has paved the way for Lebanon's various sects to achieve greater convergence against the Zionist enemy. Today, Hezbollah views itself not merely as the defender of Shia, but as the defender of the territorial integrity, independence, and dignity of the entire Lebanese nation, standing firm against any threat to this land.
/129
Your Comment